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#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from classes . parsezeeklogs import ParseZeekLogs
from netaddr import IPNetwork , IPAddress
from utils import get_iocs , get_config , get_whitelist
from ipwhois import IPWhois
import subprocess as sp
import json
import pydig
import os
class ZeekEngine ( object ) :
def __init__ ( self , capture_directory ) :
self . working_dir = capture_directory
self . alerts = [ ]
self . conns = [ ]
self . ssl = [ ]
self . http = [ ]
self . dns = [ ]
self . files = [ ]
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self . whitelist = [ ]
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# Get analysis configuration
self . heuristics_analysis = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " heuristics " ) )
self . iocs_analysis = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " iocs " ) )
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self . whitelist_analysis = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " whitelist " ) )
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def fill_dns ( self , dir ) :
"""
Fill the DNS resolutions thanks to the dns . log .
: return : nothing - all resolutions appended to self . dns .
"""
if os . path . isfile ( os . path . join ( dir , " dns.log " ) ) :
for record in ParseZeekLogs ( os . path . join ( dir , " dns.log " ) , output_format = " json " , safe_headers = False ) :
if record is not None :
if record [ " qtype_name " ] in [ " A " , " AAAA " ] :
d = { " domain " : record [ " query " ] ,
" answers " : record [ " answers " ] . split ( " , " ) }
if d not in self . dns :
self . dns . append ( d )
def netflow_check ( self , dir ) :
"""
Enrich and check the netflow from the conn . log against whitelist and IOCs .
: return : nothing - all stuff appended to self . alerts
"""
max_ports = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " max_ports " ) )
http_default_port = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " http_default_port " ) )
# Get the netflow from conn.log.
if os . path . isfile ( os . path . join ( dir , " conn.log " ) ) :
for record in ParseZeekLogs ( os . path . join ( dir , " conn.log " ) , output_format = " json " , safe_headers = False ) :
if record is not None :
c = { " ip_dst " : record [ " id.resp_h " ] ,
" proto " : record [ " proto " ] ,
" port_dst " : record [ " id.resp_p " ] ,
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" service " : record [ " service " ] ,
" alert_tiggered " : False }
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if c not in self . conns :
self . conns . append ( c )
# Let's add some dns resolutions.
for c in self . conns :
c [ " resolution " ] = self . resolve ( c [ " ip_dst " ] )
# Order the conns list by the resolution field.
self . conns = sorted ( self . conns , key = lambda c : c [ " resolution " ] )
# Check for whitelisted assets, if any, delete the record.
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if self . whitelist_analysis :
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wl_cidrs = [ IPNetwork ( cidr ) for cidr in get_whitelist ( " cidr " ) ]
wl_hosts = get_whitelist ( " ip4addr " ) + get_whitelist ( " ip6addr " )
wl_domains = get_whitelist ( " domain " )
for i , c in enumerate ( self . conns ) :
if c [ " ip_dst " ] in [ ip for ip in wl_hosts ] :
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self . whitelist . append ( self . conns [ i ] )
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self . conns [ i ] = False
elif c [ " resolution " ] in wl_domains :
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self . whitelist . append ( self . conns [ i ] )
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self . conns [ i ] = False
elif True in [ c [ " resolution " ] . endswith ( " . " + dom ) for dom in wl_domains ] :
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self . whitelist . append ( self . conns [ i ] )
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self . conns [ i ] = False
elif True in [ IPAddress ( c [ " ip_dst " ] ) in cidr for cidr in wl_cidrs ] :
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self . whitelist . append ( self . conns [ i ] )
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self . conns [ i ] = False
# Let's delete whitelisted connections.
self . conns = list ( filter ( lambda c : c != False , self . conns ) )
if self . heuristics_analysis :
for c in self . conns :
# Check for UDP / ICMP (strange from a smartphone.)
if c [ " proto " ] in [ " UDP " , " ICMP " ] :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " {} communication going outside the local network to {} . " . format ( c [ " proto " ] . upper ( ) , c [ " resolution " ] ) ,
" description " : " The {} protocol is commonly used in internal networks. Please, verify if the host {} leveraged other alerts which may " . format ( c [ " proto " ] . upper ( ) , c [ " resolution " ] )
+ " indicates a possible malicious behavior. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " PROTO-01 " } )
# Check for use of ports over 1024.
if c [ " port_dst " ] > = max_ports :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " {} connection to {} to a port over or equal to {} . " . format ( c [ " proto " ] . upper ( ) , c [ " resolution " ] , max_ports ) ,
" description " : " {} connections have been seen to {} by using the port {} . The use of non-standard port can be sometimes associated to malicious activities. " . format ( c [ " proto " ] . upper ( ) , c [ " resolution " ] , c [ " port_dst " ] )
+ " We recommend to check if this host has a good reputation by looking on other alerts and search it on the internet. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Low " ,
" id " : " PROTO-02 " } )
# Check for use of HTTP.
if c [ " service " ] == " http " and c [ " port_dst " ] == http_default_port :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " HTTP communications have been done to the host {} " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] ) ,
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" description " : " Your device exchanged with the host {} by using HTTP, an unencrypted protocol. " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
+ " Even if this behavior is not malicious by itself, it is unusual to see HTTP communications issued from smartphone applications "
+ " running in the background. Please check the host reputation by searching it on the internet. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Low " ,
" id " : " PROTO-03 " } )
# Check for use of HTTP on a non standard port.
if c [ " service " ] == " http " and c [ " port_dst " ] != http_default_port :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " HTTP communications have been seen to the host {} on a non standard port ( {} ). " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , c [ " port_dst " ] ) ,
" description " : " Your device exchanged with the host {} by using HTTP, an unencrypted protocol on the port {} . " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , c [ " port_dst " ] )
+ " This behavior is quite unusual. Please check the host reputation by searching it on the internet. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " PROTO-04 " } )
# Check for non-resolved IP address.
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if c [ " ip_dst " ] == c [ " resolution " ] :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " The server {} hasn ' t been resolved by any DNS query during the session " . format ( c [ " ip_dst " ] ) ,
" description " : " It means that the server {} is likely not resolved by any domain name or the resolution has already been cached by " . format ( c [ " ip_dst " ] )
+ " the device. If the host appears in other alerts, please check it. " ,
" host " : c [ " ip_dst " ] ,
" level " : " Low " ,
" id " : " PROTO-05 " } )
if self . iocs_analysis :
bl_cidrs = [ [ IPNetwork ( cidr [ 0 ] ) , cidr [ 1 ] ]
for cidr in get_iocs ( " cidr " ) ]
bl_hosts = get_iocs ( " ip4addr " ) + get_iocs ( " ip6addr " )
bl_domains = get_iocs ( " domain " )
bl_freedns = get_iocs ( " freedns " )
bl_nameservers = get_iocs ( " ns " )
bl_tlds = get_iocs ( " tld " )
for c in self . conns :
# Check for blacklisted IP address.
for host in bl_hosts :
if c [ " ip_dst " ] == host [ 0 ] :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A connection has been made to {} ( {} ) which is tagged as {} . " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , c [ " ip_dst " ] , host [ 1 ] . upper ( ) ) ,
" description " : " The host {} has been explicitly blacklisted for malicious activities. Your device is likely compromised " . format ( c [ " ip_dst " ] )
+ " and needs to be investigated more deeply by IT security professionals. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " High " ,
" id " : " IOC-01 " } )
break
# Check for blacklisted CIDR.
for cidr in bl_cidrs :
if IPAddress ( c [ " ip_dst " ] ) in cidr [ 0 ] :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " Communication to {} under the CIDR {} which is tagged as {} . " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , cidr [ 0 ] , cidr [ 1 ] . upper ( ) ) ,
" description " : " The server {} is hosted under a network which is known to host malicious activities. Even if this behavior is not malicious by itself, " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
+ " you need to check if other alerts are also mentioning this host. If you have some doubts, please "
+ " search this host on the internet to see if its legit or not. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " IOC-02 " } )
# Check for blacklisted domain.
for domain in bl_domains :
if c [ " resolution " ] . endswith ( domain [ 0 ] ) :
if domain [ 1 ] != " tracker " :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A DNS request have been done to {} which is tagged as {} . " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , domain [ 1 ] . upper ( ) ) ,
" description " : " The domain name {} seen in the capture has been explicitly tagged as malicious. This indicates that " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
+ " your device is likely compromised and needs to be investigated deeply. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " High " ,
" id " : " IOC-03 " } )
else :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A DNS request have been done to {} which is tagged as {} . " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , domain [ 1 ] . upper ( ) ) ,
" description " : " The domain name {} seen in the capture has been explicitly tagged as a Tracker. This " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
+ " indicates that one of the active apps is geo-tracking your moves. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " IOC-03 " } )
# Check for blacklisted FreeDNS.
for domain in bl_freedns :
if c [ " resolution " ] . endswith ( " . " + domain [ 0 ] ) :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A DNS request have been done to the domain {} which is a Free DNS. " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] ) ,
" description " : " The domain name {} is using a Free DNS service. This kind of service is commonly used by cybercriminals " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
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+ " or state-sponsored threat actors during their operations. It is very suspicious that an application running in background use this kind of service, please investigate. " ,
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" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " IOC-04 " } )
# Check for suspect tlds.
for tld in bl_tlds :
if c [ " resolution " ] . endswith ( tld [ 0 ] ) :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A DNS request have been done to the domain {} which contains a suspect TLD. " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] ) ,
" description " : " The domain name {} is using a suspect Top Level Domain ( {} ). Even not malicious, this non-generic TLD is used regularly by cybercrime " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , tld [ 0 ] )
+ " or state-sponsored operations. Please check this domain by searching it on an internet search engine. If other alerts are related to this "
+ " host, please consider it as very suspicious. " ,
" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Low " ,
" id " : " IOC-05 " } )
# Check for use of suspect nameservers.
try :
name_servers = pydig . query ( c [ " resolution " ] , " NS " )
except :
name_servers = [ ]
if len ( name_servers ) :
for ns in bl_nameservers :
if name_servers [ 0 ] . endswith ( " . {} . " . format ( ns [ 0 ] ) ) :
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " The domain {} is using a suspect nameserver ( {} ). " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] , name_servers [ 0 ] ) ,
" description " : " The domain name {} is using a nameserver that has been explicitly tagged to be associated to malicious activities. " . format ( c [ " resolution " ] )
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+ " Many cybercriminals and state-sponsored threat actors are using this kind of registrars because they allow cryptocurrencies and anonymous payments. It "
+ " is adviced to investigate on this domain and the associated running application by doing a forensic analysis of the phone. " ,
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" host " : c [ " resolution " ] ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " IOC-06 " } )
def files_check ( self , dir ) :
"""
Check on the files . log :
* Check certificates sha1
* [ todo ] Check possible binary data or APKs ?
: return : nothing - all stuff appended to self . alerts
"""
if not self . iocs_analysis :
return
bl_certs = get_iocs ( " sha1cert " )
if os . path . isfile ( os . path . join ( dir , " files.log " ) ) :
for record in ParseZeekLogs ( os . path . join ( dir , " files.log " ) , output_format = " json " , safe_headers = False ) :
if record is not None :
f = { " filename " : record [ " filename " ] ,
" ip_src " : record [ " tx_hosts " ] ,
" ip_dst " : record [ " rx_hosts " ] ,
" mime_type " : record [ " mime_type " ] ,
" sha1 " : record [ " sha1 " ] }
if f not in self . files :
self . files . append ( f )
for f in self . files :
if f [ " mime_type " ] == " application/x-x509-ca-cert " :
for cert in bl_certs : # Check for blacklisted certificate.
if f [ " sha1 " ] == cert [ 0 ] :
host = self . resolve ( f [ " ip_dst " ] )
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c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " A certificate associated to {} activities have been found in the communication to {} . " . format ( cert [ 1 ] . upper ( ) , host ) ,
" description " : " The certificate ( {} ) associated to {} has been explicitly tagged as malicious. This indicates that " . format ( f [ " sha1 " ] , host )
+ " your device is likely compromised and need a forensic analysis. " ,
" host " : host ,
" level " : " High " ,
" id " : " IOC-07 " } )
def ssl_check ( self , dir ) :
"""
Check on the ssl . log :
* SSL connections which doesn ' t use the 443.
* " Free " certificate issuer ( taken from the config ) .
* Self - signed certificates .
: return : nothing - all stuff appended to self . alerts
"""
ssl_default_ports = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " ssl_default_ports " ) )
free_issuers = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " free_issuers " ) )
if os . path . isfile ( os . path . join ( dir , " ssl.log " ) ) :
for record in ParseZeekLogs ( os . path . join ( dir , " ssl.log " ) , output_format = " json " , safe_headers = False ) :
if record is not None :
c = { " host " : record [ ' id.resp_h ' ] ,
" port " : record [ ' id.resp_p ' ] ,
" issuer " : record [ " issuer " ] ,
" validation_status " : record [ " validation_status " ] }
if c not in self . ssl :
self . ssl . append ( c )
if self . heuristics_analysis :
for cert in self . ssl :
host = self . resolve ( cert [ " host " ] )
# If the associated host has not whitelisted, check the cert.
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for c in self . conns :
if host in c [ " resolution " ] :
# Check for non generic SSL port.
if cert [ " port " ] not in ssl_default_ports :
c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
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self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " SSL connection done on a non standard port ( {} ) to {} " . format ( cert [ " port " ] , host ) ,
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" description " : " It is not common to see SSL connections issued from smartphones using non-standard ports. Even this can be totally legit, "
+ " we recommend to check the reputation of {} , by looking at its WHOIS record, the associated autonomus system, its creation date, and " . format ( host )
+ " by searching it the internet. " ,
" host " : host ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " SSL-01 " } )
# Check Free SSL certificates.
if cert [ " issuer " ] in free_issuers :
c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " An SSL connection to {} is using a free certificate. " . format ( host ) ,
" description " : " Free certificates — such as Let ' s Encrypt — are wildly used by command and control servers associated to "
+ " malicious implants or phishing web pages. We recommend to check the host associated to this certificate, "
+ " by looking at the domain name, its creation date, or by checking its reputation on the internet. " ,
" host " : host ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " SSL-02 " } )
# Check for self-signed certificates.
if cert [ " validation_status " ] == " self signed certificate in certificate chain " :
c [ " alert_tiggered " ] = True
self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " The certificate associated to {} is self-signed. " . format ( host ) ,
" description " : " The use of self-signed certificates is a common thing for attacker infrastructure. We recommend to check the host {} " . format ( host )
+ " which is associated to this certificate, by looking at the domain name (if any), its WHOIS record, its creation date, and "
+ " by checking its reputation on the internet. " ,
" host " : host ,
" level " : " Moderate " ,
" id " : " SSL-03 " } )
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def alerts_check ( self ) :
"""
Leverage an advice to the user based on the trigered hosts
: return : nothing - all generated alerts appended to self . alerts
"""
hosts = { }
for alert in [ dict ( t ) for t in { tuple ( d . items ( ) ) for d in self . alerts } ] :
if alert [ " host " ] not in hosts :
hosts [ alert [ " host " ] ] = 1
else :
hosts [ alert [ " host " ] ] + = 1
for host , nb in hosts . items ( ) :
if nb > = get_config ( ( " analysis " , " max_alerts " ) ) :
self . alerts . append ( { " title " : " Check alerts for {} " . format ( host ) ,
" description " : " Please, check the reputation of the host {} , this one seems to be malicious as it leveraged {} alerts during the session. " . format ( host , nb ) ,
" host " : host ,
" level " : " High " ,
" id " : " ADV-01 " } )
def resolve ( self , ip_addr ) :
"""
A simple method to retreive DNS names from IP addresses
in order to replace them in alerts .
: return : String - DNS record or IP Address .
"""
for record in self . dns :
if ip_addr in record [ " answers " ] :
return record [ " domain " ]
return ip_addr
def start_zeek ( self ) :
"""
Start zeek and check the logs .
"""
sp . Popen ( " cd {} && /opt/zeek/bin/zeek -Cr capture.pcap protocols/ssl/validate-certs " . format (
self . working_dir ) , shell = True ) . wait ( )
sp . Popen ( " cd {} && mv *.log assets/ " . format ( self . working_dir ) ,
shell = True ) . wait ( )
self . fill_dns ( self . working_dir + " /assets/ " )
self . netflow_check ( self . working_dir + " /assets/ " )
self . ssl_check ( self . working_dir + " /assets/ " )
self . files_check ( self . working_dir + " /assets/ " )
self . alerts_check ( )
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def retrieve_alerts ( self ) :
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"""
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Retrieve alerts .
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: return : list - a list of alerts wihout duplicates .
"""
return [ dict ( t ) for t in { tuple ( d . items ( ) ) for d in self . alerts } ]
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def retrieve_whitelist ( self ) :
"""
Retrieve whitelisted elements .
: return : list - a list of whitelisted elements wihout duplicates .
"""
return [ dict ( t ) for t in { tuple ( d . items ( ) ) for d in self . whitelist } ]
def retrieve_conns ( self ) :
"""
Retrieve not whitelisted elements .
: return : list - a list of non - whitelisted elements wihout duplicates .
"""
return self . conns